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PRIMUS INTER PARES: POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIL

SOCIETY
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM*

The voluminous literature on civil society ignores political
parties. Political theorists and social scientists talk about religious
associations, social movements and advocacy groups, book clubs and
athletic teams, and unions and membership groups like the Rotary
Club and Jaycees. They embrace voluntary associations formed for
every conceivable purpose, but not political parties.,
Indeed,
normative democratic theory generally ignores parties or takes them
up in the limited context of egalitarian arguments for campaign
finance reform.2 We may reasonably expect that civil society theory,
concerned as it is with associations that mediate between the
individual or family and state, would focus on parties. The fact that
they are rarely mentioned is a remarkable lacuna.
Political

parties share some of their purposes with

other

associations. Voluntary associations from unions to fraternal and
ethnic groups take up political issues and nudge them into public
consciousness. Separation of church and state does not prohibit
political advocacy by religious associations, electioneering, or office-

* Henry Merritt Wriston Professor and Professor of Political Science, Brown University.
1. See CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND Civic RENEWAL (Robert K. Fullinwider ed.,
1999); COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS (1998); NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS:
How Civic DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998).
The National Index of Civic Health does have a political component: voter turnout, writing a
letter to a public official, work for a party or candidates, and attend a rally or political meeting.
See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 24,34-36.
2. A notable exception is C.B. Macpherson, who attacks parties for functioning to
produce a stable equilibrium that mutes class conflict. Macpherson argues that party systems
are "blurring systems." C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
65-66 (1977). For a discussion of ideal democratic parties, see id. at 113-14. Two contemporary
exceptions in democratic theory are Joshua Cohen and Bernard Manin. See Joshua Cohen,
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLrrY 17, 21-26 (Alan Hamlin &
Philip Pettit eds., 1991); BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1997). In the political science literature, by contrast, political parties have been
central whether the approach is rational choice, institutionalism, or political culture. For
instance, Leon Epstein reviews political scientists' commitment to parties as an object of study
and to their practical usefulness. LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN
MOLD (1986).
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seeking by clerics. Many voluntary associations support the activities
of advocacy groups. And nonpolitical groups of all kinds teach
organizing skills that are transferable to political arenas. For all of
these groups, political expression is an adjunct to their principal
purposes; their democratic effects follow unintentionally or as an
indirect consequence of their defining activities. Of course, the
effects of many voluntary associations are positively antidemocratic.
Their internal organization is hierarchic; their leadership is
authoritarian; they disregard due process and fairness; their agendas
are antithetical to civic norms. Secret societies and hate groups are
only the most obvious examples. In contrast to all these groups,
political parties are the voluntary association principally committed to
making democracy work.
Plainly, many nonparty political organizations share in the
business of organizing interests and values and wielding political
influence: interest groups and advocacy groups, professional
associations and business groups (or their political action
committees), and the media. The expansion of government is
reciprocally related to the growth of organizations that attempt to
forge links to the political representatives and government agencies
whose decisions affect them. These groups are committed to making
government work, not necessarily democracy.
Strictly speaking we must add to the catalogue of nonparty
political associations the campaign organizations of candidates for
state and federal offices. These are not just the creation of
"independents." All candidates build and operate organizations
largely independent of the state and national party with which they
are formally allied by label. Candidates raise their own money. They
hire their own contractors-specialists in media, lawyers, and
accountants. Self-nomination without party support much less legal
endorsement has become familiar, particularly by self-financed
candidates who take advantage of the fact that the law allows them to
spend unlimited amounts of their personal wealth. As a legal matter,
presidential candidates who accept public funding are required to
receive and expend funds through their personal campaign
organizations not their party's.
Despite overlap in some areas, then, there are important
differences and a real division of labor between parties and other
political groups, which I will come to shortly. Put simply, the right to
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be on the election ballot is what separates a political party from other
political associations.3 No other group is engaged in recruiting,
nominating, and educating citizens about candidates and issues for
the astonishing number and kind of elective offices at the local, state,
and federal levels in the United States; and no other group takes a
similarly comprehensive view of the public interest and political
agenda. In addition, only parties "routinely, pervasively, and
legitimately exercise their influence from within the government. '4 It
is not too much to say that both public political life and political
education are in their hands.
This is clear enough to scholars of comparative politics. Political
scientists do not simply infer the importance of parties from their
universal existence in stable democracies.' No matter how varied and
vital the array of secondary associations in civil society, representative
democracy cannot function without freedom for political association
generally and for parties specifically. Parties are necessary for
transferring office from one faction to another, and peaceful
succession is possible only where partisanship (or the notion of "a
loyal opposition") is legitimate. Voting rights and elections do not
suffice for insuring choice among competing governance groups,
focusing and expressing divergent views of the public interest, and
deliberating and setting agenda. New democracies often lack parties
or have volatile parties organized around "clientelism" or
personalities rather than political cleavages. Their survival rate is
modest-accenting the importance not just of parties per se but of a
reasonably stable party system.6
The lacuna in theories of civil society is more remarkable
because the value civil society theorists place on intermediary
associations should make the democratic alternative-direct
democracy-anathema. As practiced in the United States, plebescitary candidacies and popular initiatives and referenda
institutionalize atomistic individualism. Direct democracy epitomizes
the simple aggregation of individual preferences. The "collective
decision" is collective only in outcome, in name only. Political
3. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 U.S. 1364, 1377 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
4. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical
Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1993).
5. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 19.
6. See, e.g., Barbara Geddes, A ComparativePerspectiveon the Leninist Legacy in Eastern
Europe, 28 COMP. POL. STUD. 239, 239-71 (1995); Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party
Cleavages in Post-CommunistDemocracies, 1 PARTY POL. 447, 447-72 (1995).
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decisions are made anonymously, apart from regular, standing
political associations. Further, these decisions are made without
opportunities for compromise and in the absence of even the minimal
assurances of the "trial of debate" and the need to provide reasons,
which we find in legislative policymaking (and in classic direct
democracy where the people are assembled). The questions posed
are not democratically inspired. Rather, formulating initiatives and
referenda are typically the work of independent political
entrepreneurs and special interest groups unconnected to established,
broad-based political groups. They are promoted through privately
funded campaigns organized by political professionals employing
targeted direct mailing, market testing, and paid signature gatherers. 7
Nor can statutory initiatives and referenda be justified in classic
terms as popular attempts to tie the hands of officials-as popular
self-defense against entrenched political machines and legislators
captured by special interests. Increasingly, initiatives and referenda
are willingly acceded to by political representatives as a way of
deciding controversial political issues; legislators give over
policymaking to the uneasy mix of "special interests" and
majoritarianism that comprises direct democracy today. We would
expect civil society theorists to acknowledge parties as the principal
mediating institutions that temper these trends.
My first objective in this essay, then, is to reflect on the absence
of political parties in discussions of American civil society-on why
they fall from the lists of voluntary associations and membership
groups. I then argue that among associations of civil society, political
parties are primus inter partes. I outline their qualitative
distinctiveness and indicate why parties are unique and irreplaceable
voluntary associations, meriting serious study by political theorists.
More specifically, the defining characteristics of parties as voluntary
associations and membership groups provide the armature of
justification for valuing and strengthening them.
It is possible to stand back and think of electoral parties as cadres
of candidates, professional organizers, and hired consultants, and of
citizens as consumers of their products. E.J. Dionne, Jr., describes
7. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, Take the Initiative, Please: Referendum Madness in California,

AM. PROSPECr, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 61, 61-63. Courts have facilitated this by striking down a
number of constraints imposed by state law on proposing and supporting initiatives. See
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999); see also id at 651 n.3
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that there is evidence in the briefs that circulators of initiatives
do not discuss the merits of the proposed change in any depth).
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contemporary party politics as "an elaborate insider industry."8 That
may be an apt characterization of candidates' campaign
organizations, but as an account of parties it is truncated. Similarly,
the characterization of parties as electoral parties simpliciter,
supplying voters with "brand names" and low cost information about
candidates-mechanisms for "reducing the transaction costs" of
democracy-is truncated as well.
Only broad-based parties that have the publicly affirmed
affiliation and participation of a significant number of active members
can field candidates and hire experts. Parties are groups that people
identify with, actively join, contribute to, work within, become
officers of, and participate in-setting agendas, goals, and strategies.9
Both the large-scale, long-term effects of parties on the political
system and political culture overall and their capacity to shape the
democratic dispositions and practices of citizens personally and
individually are a function of their vitality as membership groups.
In saying that civil society theorists should give parties a central
place, and that they should be at least as solicitous of political parties
as the many other associations that are objects of concern today, I do
not mean to weigh into the debate about the trajectory of American
parties. I also do not consider here whether and in what ways parties
are weaker or stronger today than at some baseline time period in the
past.
Further, I do not take up the current accuracy of
Schattschneider's claim that national parties are "only the transparent
filaments of the ghost of a party."' 10 Simply, the justification I propose
for valuing political parties, and for their centrality to democratic civil
society, is based on their distinctive characteristics as membership
groups.
This justification differs from the two pro-party positions that
dominate the legal and political science literatures. It diverges
significantly from the case for strengthening parties in order to secure
"responsible party government."'" It also diverges from the case
8. E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE PoLmIcs 332 (1991).
9. See PAUL ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLrICS IN AMERICA 8-9 (7th
ed. 1992).
10. E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 163 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1942). For
an account of the increasing strength of state and national party organizations, see BECK &
SORAUF, supra note 9, at 140. Among other things, parties have a federated structure and local
and state associations are as significant as national parties. See John P. Frendreis et al., The
ElectoralRelevance of Local Party Organizations,84 AM. POL. So. REV. 225, 225-35 (1990).
11. The literature is vast. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL PARTIES, AM. POLITICAL
SCIENCE ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (1950).
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democratic theorists make for reforming the electoral system as a
whole in order to secure political equality. Theorists of political
equality see public laws-specifically ballot access rules and campaign
12
finance law-as the principal determinants of the health of party life.
In contrast, I argue that the internal nomos of parties as
associations-their rules, leadership, organization, sense of purpose,
and relation to members-is as important as external conditions,
including the regulatory framework within which they operate.
That is why it is plausible to think that parties themselves bear
responsibility for perpetuating what Robert Lane has called the
"unhappy polity" and contributing to "why Americans hate
politics."'1 3 Why then have they failed to capture the attention of
theorists of civil society?
MISSING PARTIES

The documented American disdain for and avoidance of politics
is the larger cultural context in which parties carry on their business.
The range of negative postures toward parties-from "abolitionist" to
ambivalent to grudgingly reconciled-has been vividly described.
The underlying belief that parties tend to divisiveness, oligarchy, and
corruption has been registered.
(I leave aside the recurrent
conspiracist tendency that leads people to cast parties as secretive
societies in the service of sinister interests.) 14 The array of
government regulations imposed on American parties-unique
among democracies-reflects recurrent attempts to rein them in.
Nothing is more common than the assertion that good citizens
should vote for the candidate and not the party, or its corollary-that
the good representative votes his or her conscience and not the party
line. Public confidence in political parties lies at the bottom of the
scale, lower than any other secondary association: 42.6% of
respondents express "very little" and only 3.8% "a great deal" of
confidence in them. 15 Even active partisanship, Austin Ranney notes,
12. For an important analysis of ways of considering political equality, see CHARLES R.
BErrz, POLITICAL EQUALITY (1989); Cohen, supra note 2, at 30; MANIN, supra note 2.

13. Robert E. Lane, The Joyless Polity: Contributionsof DemocraticProcesses to Ill-Being,
in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 329, 362-64 (Stephen L. Elkin &

Karol Soltan eds., 1999); see also DIONNE, supra note 8. The author does not focus on parties as
associations but on ideology.
14. For a discussion of conspiracism and American voluntary associations, see NANCY L.
ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 239-84 (1998).
15.

See VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., GALLUP ORG., GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING

IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1996).
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cannot be taken to indicate approval of parties in general as desirable
institutions. 16 Insofar as American political life arouses enthusiasm, it
attaches to social movements, ideological causes, or unusually
inspiring candidates. Of course, antiparty and antipolitical sentiment
(the two are not distinguished in the public mind) is episodic. But it is
fair to say that there is little appreciation for broad-based state and
national parties.
By itself diffuse, mistrust cannot explain why serious theorists of
democratic civil society ignore parties, however. Five considerations
converge to produce this result.
For one thing, "civil society" entered the contemporary political
theory lexicon from Eastern Europe where it was an oppositional
idea. Civil society referred to an underground "parallel polis" of
cultural and intellectual groups. When active resistance against
political authority emerged, it was precipitated by churches and
unions. These groups were also seen as the materials for ideal social
restructuring. It is not surprising that attention focused on the
political uses of nonpolitical groups; in the absence of freedom of
political association, parties were unthinkable. And even with a
degree of freedom of association, political parties as channels from
civil society to political representation have been slow to develop.
The resurgence of interest in civil society in the United States
was initially inspired by this literature on resistance to communist
regimes, which had little to say about political parties. Moreover,
many American civil society theorists write from a tradition of
socialism or democratic radicalism and tend to think in terms of
oppositional social movements dedicated to radical social change. 17
They prize activism outside of institutions like parties that are
presumably tainted by day to day politics. Jane Mansbridge points
out that interest in political participation as a form of democratic
education is "ghettoized in the feminist and ecological movements.' 18
A second reason for the eclipse of political parties is that not all
civil society theorists are preoccupied with the effects of groups on
either democratic political life or democratic habits and dispositions.
16. AUSTIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA

52 (1975).
17. See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1992); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).

18. Jane Mansbridge, On the Idea That ParticipationMakes Better Citizens, in CITIZEN
COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 291, 315 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward

Soltan eds., 1999).
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They are concerned instead with extra-political groups. 19 They focus
on families and the inculcation of basic values, or on voluntary
associations as sources of trust and social capital. They look for
associations to serve as schools of civic but not necessarily political
virtues such as tolerance and mutual respect. From this perspective,
the description of Americans as "passive" and "disengaged" refers to
disconnection from secondary associations generally and a diffuse
lack of responsibility for the community rather than disengagement
from electoral politics specifically. In Membership and Morals: The
Personal Uses of Pluralism in America, I considered the full range of
moral uses of associational life, intended and unintended, and parties
played only a small part in that study. 20 The impetus to this essay was
the challenge colleagues posed to identify the associations that stand
out as qualitatively most valuable for democratic public life and
political virtue.2
More important perhaps is the normative reason behind civil
society theorists' neglect of parties. The moral valence of civil society
attaches to small groups that have a direct and immediate improving
impact on social problems and on members themselves. The
exemplary associations are faith-based groups and neighborhood
community organizations, philanthropic and social service groups.
Priority is assigned to membership in volunteer-type activities that
involve face-to-face cooperation and are said to "make a
22
difference."
Given the connection between effectiveness and small groups,
civil society theorists do not see parties as having an immediate
impact on social problems or affording the specific gratification that
attracts and motivates members: they believe parties are much less
capable of recruiting disconnected individuals and eliciting
cooperation among them.23 Indeed, civil society theorists may not
19. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 14 (1996).
20. ROSENBLUM, supra note 14, at 155.
21. Principally, I am referring to the provocative comments of William Galston. See
William Galston, Remarks at the Panel on Nancy L. Rosenblum's Membership and Morals, the
Communitarian Summit (Feb. 27, 1999).
22. Elizabeth Crowley, More Young People Turn Away from Politics and Concentrate
Instead on Community Service, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1999, at A28 (quoting Sarah Kolar, a
recent college graduate and participant in the Jesuit Volunteer Corps program).
23. See, e.g., David Wasserman, Self-Help Groups, Community, and Civil Society, in CIVIL
SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 231, 231-54; Robert Wuthnow,
The Role of Trust in Civic Renewal, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL,
supra note 1, at 209, 209-30. Urban political party "machines" were, in part, service
organizations. Developed in response to the needs of immigrants, they provided social services,
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count parties as civic-oriented membership groups at all. Small
wonder "participation" is identified with "efforts to start a hospital or
help the homeless" and that the label "activist" attaches to
community service not political partisanship.2
Ideological motivations for renewed interest in civil society also
militate against attending to political parties. Whether the chief
concern is the crisis of the welfare state or moral values (or their
interconnection), both radical democrats and conservatives are
critical of "big government." They look to civil society as the realm
of self-organized groups, and they advocate "subsidiarity." z From
this standpoint parties may be mediating institutions, but they mainly
seek to use government for positive ends rather than promote social
steering by associations outside of government. Parties are so
regulated by law and so associated with the organization of
government that they lose their character as voluntary and
participatory associations.
Finally, disregard for parties stems from the view that they may
be voluntary associations but that they are not democratic
associations. Theorists concur with Schattschneider's observation
that "[d]emocracy is not to be found in the parties but between the
parties." 6 Bossism is a rarity today-irresponsible party leaders
exploiting the association for patronage or private advantage.
Instead, parties are said to be captured by wealthy interests
("[money] buys political mercenaries") 27 or staffed by professionals
who employ communication technologies to capture a mass audience.
Inapt as "toeing the party line" may be as a description of party
affiliation in America, the phrase nonetheless captures the picture of
uncritical citizens under the sway of political professionals
communicating deformed political messages. In short, parties are
inegalitarian and nondeliberative.
The corrective I propose to each of these mistaken reasons for
neglecting or disparaging parties as elements of civil society begins
with highlighting the membership face of parties.
patronage, and preferments. The machines were sources of political education and social
mobility. Contemporary parties, however, do not have that character.
24. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 14.
25. See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313,

313-42 (1997).
26. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 60. The current threat to internal democracy at
the national level at least is professionalized staff.
27. Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees in American Politics, in WHAT PRICE
PACS? 27, 83 (1984).
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POLITICAL PARTIES AS MEMBERSHIP GROUPS

V.0. Key fo 'mulated the'well-known analysis of the structure of
political parties: the party in the electorate, the party in government,
and the party organization. 28 They are functionally inseparable, of
course. Party organization is principally though not exclusively
geared to running winning candidates in elections to "control... the

levers of government" and put its policies and philosophies into
operation. 29 This typology has the merit of drawing attention to the
party as an association, but it does little to illuminate the life of
parties as membership groups. It eclipses the fluid, adaptive, and
participatory character of parties. It also obscures the parties'
importance for moral and political education, effect on civic
consciousness, and impact on the tenor and quality of political
culture.
American parties are not monolithic. They are loose and
Federalism and the
decentralized voluntary associations.
organization of parties around electoral districts have guaranteed
that. The "iron-clad requirement" that "[a]mbitious men wanting to
go to Congress must be elected from the constituency in which they
reside" largely holds. 3° Fifty states and innumerable localities "have
created thousands of partisan elected officials, party leaders, and
organizations with their own constituencies and cadres of
supporters."'"

Almost all of those supporters are partisans.

As

Nelson Polsby observes, the American two-party system masks a
32
hundred-party system.
Party organizations at the state level vary, but they are typically
flexible and nonhierarchical. Some are really confederations of local
organizations. Although both major national parties may be stronger
today than in the recent past, this has neither centralized national
committee control of state parties nor created formal, federated
parties. All state parties enlist volunteer functionaries corresponding
to the voting districts of the state-for example, local precinct-level

28.

V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (1964).

29. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see
also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 222 n.9 (1952) (quoting Seay v. Latham, 182 S.W.2d 251, 253
(Tex. 1944)); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837,844 (D. Conn. 1976).
30. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 105.
31. JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECrIONS IN AMERICA 60 (2d ed. 1992).
32. Nelson W. Polsby, The American Party System, in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 37, 40

(1997).
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33
committee persons, ward representatives, state central committees.
Political parties offer expansive and unusually varied opportunities
for involvement: political street work, contact activities, public
education, working committees, and caucuses and conventions. The
forms of participation overall are significantly egalitarian. Skills,
energy, commitment, and time are as important as money for many
party activities. More than in most political associations, questions of
openness, representativeness, recruitment, and internal democracy
are salient.
Moreover, the motivations of active party members mirror those
valued by civil society theorists. Civil service reforms diminished the
material rewards of party activism. The incentives today are
personal, solidary rewards, and issue or ideological goals. In addition,
members' incentives change. Studies indicate that activists who
became engaged for issue-related reasons come to find that social
gratification and identification with the party become their dominant
motivations 4 They are rewarded with "social contacts and
friendships," the "fun and excitement of politics," and the "feeling of
recognition in the community. '35 There is also a pronounced civic
incentive to participate: "Scholars who have questioned party
workers about their motives for service... know the familiar answers.
They were asked to serve, and they assented because it was their civic
duty." 36
In considering parties as membership groups, should we count
Schattschneider was
voters, at least primary election voters?
categorical: "Whatever else parties may be, they are not associations
of the voters who support the party candidates. '37 The common view
is that affiliation qua voter is slight, tenuous, and fleeting. Justice
Scalia observed that the independent voter participating in the
Connecticut Republican primary "forms no more meaningful an
'association' with the Party than does the independent or the
registered Democrat who responds to questions by a Republican
Party pollster. '38 For most commentators, this is only slightly less true
of declared partisans, whose "membership" has been described as a
33. There are few paid staff at the local level. At the state level there is little relation
between the existence of party headquarters and staff and party activism or participatory
membership. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 151.
34. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 123.
35. BIBBY, supra note 31, at 113 (quoting Samuel J. Eldersveld).
36. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 124.
37. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 53.
38. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 235 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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fiction created by primary registration laws. The district court in
Nader insisted:
[Ilt is true that, in order to vote in a party's primary, plaintiffs must
publicly affiliate with that party. But enrollment in Connecticut
imposes absolutely no affirmative party obligations on the voter, in
terms of time or money, and it does not even obligate39him to vote
for the party's positions or candidates or to vote at all.
To say nothing of the fact that when it comes to registering
partisans "[t]he party as such is not consulted. It does not accept the
application; it does not vote the applicant into the association; it may
not reject the application; and, finally, there is usually no recognized
and authoritative procedure by which the party may expel a
member."4°

Even with regard to the purely electoral face of parties, this
description is bloodless. The "information" imparted by the party
label and primary voters' connection to the party are discussed as if
they are disembodied, without acknowledging mailings, telephoning,
and face-to-face encounters to recruit and shore up partisans. No one
concerned with civic consciousness should minimize the symbolic and
expressive significance of voting, as citizens themselves attest. Nor
should they fail to recognize the personal and political significance of
avowed party identification as a mark that citizens acknowledge their
politically salient values and connections.
In fact, "[p]arty identifiers have seemed so great a social reality
in the United States that they command more scholarly attention than
party organizations. ' ' 41 One reason is political scientists' specific
interest in predicting electoral outcomes. Apart from that, the "social
reality" of party identification is relevant to the membership face of
the association. Whether voting is formative or an expression of
already developed civic dispositions, the cumulative effect of voting is
pronounced.
Despite data on party decline and the rise of
independents, roughly two-thirds of the voting population avows
4
party identification and one-third avows strong party identification.
39. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Conn. 1976).
40. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 56.
41. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 240.
42. For recent data, see Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Political Party
Identification of the Adult Population, by Degree of Attachment, 1972 to 1994, and by Selected
Characteristics, 1994 (unpublished data, on file with author). Epstein points out that the rise of
independents is offset by the fact that they were "leaners" toward one or the other major party.
EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 258. For standard discussion of these measures, see BECK & SORAUF,
supra note 9, at 182, 193, 200-01; RANNEY, supra note 16, at 49-53. Bibby points out that by age
35 most people are at least occasional voters and only five percent are habitual nonvoters.
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"[M]ost voters are not merely party identifiers, by any measure, but
still cast their votes most of the time for candidates carrying their
party label. '43 Party identification accounts for most votes most of
the time.44 Moreover, strength of commitment to a party increases
the likelihood of voting, even if people do not vote consistently in
accord with party preferences. 45 Party identification may have more
of an effect on voting than it does on how votes are cast. 46 The flip
side is that "[n]onvoting is not primarily a matter of legal
impediments; it is rather caused by personal attitudes-a lack of
interest, low sense of civic obligation, and weak feelings of partisan
affiliation. Nonvoters are also more likely than voters to believe that
elections do not make a difference." 47
That said, does partisan voting have significance as an expression
of association as well as civic consciousness? The standard view is
that "the party in the electorate" is "largely a categorical group" with
no interaction, no structured relationships, and no organizational
life." Blocs of voters define the parties but do not comprise an
association; as an association, the party is "a group of working
politicians."49 Against this, voting entails an expression of association
in the sense that the extent of electoral participation is influenced by
campaign and party activities to mobilize voters who respond to
candidates, programs, and organizational efforts. 50
It is nonetheless reasonable to concede that party membership is
not usefully defined in terms of registered party voters or primary
voters. And people ramp up from partisanship to contributions,
which are an express sign of association. Oddly, like voting,
individual contributions to campaign organizations and parties are
generally seen as bare affiliation lacking civic or expressive
significance. 51 They are categorically denied to be the equivalent of
membership dues. This is surely wrong with regard to the many
BIBBY, supra note 31, at 260.
43. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 262.

44. See id. at 254.
45. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 191.
46. The independent-minded voter stands in sharp contrast to the citizen who expresses no
preference and does not vote.
47. BIBBY, supra note 31, at 261.
48. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 141.
49. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 59.
50. See BIBBY, supra note 31, at 262; EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 240.
51. For a balanced discussion, see SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 288-303
(1995).
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individual contributors who regularly make donations large and small
in response to party appeals. Contributions were depreciated in the
Supreme Court's argument in Buckley that they are a form of
association "by proxy,"5 2 the implication being that contributions are
morally deficient, an anticivic substitute for personal association and
participation.
It is one thing to erect a moral hierarchy of forms of participation
and association and another to disparage anything less than ideal
activism. Party voting and "association by contribution" are not the
only forms of political participation cast as trivial. Lobbying used to
be defined as contact with legislators by professionals-in contrast to
grassroots mobilization. Today, grassroots lobbying techniques
invented by Ralph Nader's consumer-based groups have been
adopted by all sorts of associations, including parties, which mobilize
their constituents to contact decision makers.
This form of
association and expression too is often diminished as "astroturf"
participation. 3 Clearly, electronic mail is not dialogic. But it is
churlish to deny that this is democratic and in some cases partisan
participation on a large scale4
Even if most partisans are simply voters and inactive in party
affairs, making the designation "member" inapt, this assessment
passes over the association of volunteer activists that guides the
"party in the electorate" and the many party officials legally
responsible for party activities. Where most political interest and
advocacy groups are predominantly mailing-list associations, local,
state, and national parties seek not only a publicly affiliated clientele
of voters and contributors but also active members. The number of
activists should not be passed over lightly. Beck and Sorauf estimate
that a fully staffed, two-party system assumes the participation of at
least 200,000 men and women. 5 Moreover, active membership is
gripping. Voters can switch parties but active members cannot
readily displace their disagreements about candidates or programs.
In contrast to religious dissenters, they cannot exit easily; the market
of parties is immeasurably thinner than the market of religious
groups. Members must "exit" party life entirely or amplify their
"voices" within.
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,241 (1976).
53. See DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE 187 (1992).
54. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 14, at 234.
55. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 75.
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My point: there is no bright line between party organizations as
membership groups and electoral parties whose members are partisan
voters. Austin Ranney observed that American parties are unique
among associations because they do not have effective control of their
own legal membership (a reference to state-mandated open
primaries) and "there is no formal distinction between member and
supporter. '56
Justice Marshall framed the ambiguity in more
constructive terms:
A major state political party necessarily includes individuals
playing a broad spectrum of roles in the organization's activities.
Some of the Party's members devote substantial portions of their
lives to furthering its political and organizational goals, others
provide substantial financial support, while still others limit their
participation to casting their votes for some or all of the Party's
candidates. Considered from the standpoint of the Party itself, the
act of formal enrollment or public affiliation with the Party is
merely one element in the continuum of participation in Party
affairs, and need not be in any sense the most important. 7
There are good reasons to characterize parties as membership
groups and recognize that to some extent associational life is affected
by the legal framework in which they operate. Like almost every
voluntary association except for the most intimate, parties must
conform to certain public norms, which are legally enforced. Parties,
however, are regulated more than most groups in civil society, and
these regulations are contested. In addition, state laws go to the heart
of parties' freedom of association: control of the group's membership.
Accordingly, the best first step into parties as primus inter pares,
before turning to their qualitative distinctiveness, is via their unusual
legal status.
PUBLIC UTILITIES/EXPRESSIVE ASSoCIATIONS

Parties are not just mediating institutions. They are "transitional
objects" par excellence and Janus-faced. From the standpoint of
political representation, electoral parties stand between citizens and
the organization of government. As membership groups, parties are
oriented in the other direction. They are voluntary associations for
deliberation and organization, giving effective political expression to
the interests and values of individuals and groups as they bear on the
56. BIBBY, supra note 31, at 75 (quoting AusTIN RANNEY, THE GOVERNING OF MEN 199
(4th ed. 1975)).
57. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215 (1986).
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public interest.
Legally, parties have two faces: for some purposes they are
highly regulated, for other purposes they are deemed constitutionally
protected voluntary associations. Parties' mixed status was officially
pronounced by the courts in the White Primary Cases.58 Where states
make primary elections an integral part of the electoral process to
provide access to the general election ballot, the right to vote is
protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
therefore parties cannot exclude black voters. 59 The mixed status of
parties was restated in Duke v. Massey under notably different racial
circumstances.6 The Georgia Republican Party's refusal to place
former Ku Klux Klan head David Duke's name on the presidential
preference primary list was judged to be both the action of
representatives of the party (exercising their right to limit association
to those they accept as members) and state action (because Georgia
assigned authority to exclude a candidate from the party's primary
ballot to a panel consisting of the state party chair and party leader in
each house of the legislature).61
Of course, many voluntary associations in civil society have a
Many groups are classified as "public
quasi-public character.
accommodations" because they are seen as important sources of
social and economic opportunity, justifying state and federal laws
requiring these groups to conform to liberal principles of due process
and nondiscrimination, fairness, and equal respect. What I have
called "the logic of congruence" circumscribes freedom of
association-for example, when the state of Minnesota requires the
Jaycees to open their membership to women. 2 Additionally, parties
are required to insure fairness and equal protection of the law, as the

58. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-23, at 787-90
(1978).
59. See Clifton McCleskey, Partiesat the Bar: Equal Protection, Freedom of Association,
and the Rights of Political Organizations, 46 J. POL. 346, 354-56 (1984). The same reasoning
justifies state intervention in the straw ballot (preprimary primary) of the Texas Jaybird party,
even though the group did not appear on the ballot, on grounds that the association was the
only effective part of the elective process in the county. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 46970 (1953). This application of the Fourteenth Amendment has been restricted to cases involving
racial exclusion in one-party contests. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The right to
vote has not been successful in challenges to closed primaries brought by independents or those
who do not want to register as a partisan. Nor does this reasoning apply to party activities
generally. See McCleskey, supra at 355.
60. 87 F.3d 1226, 1231 (llth Cir. 1996).
61. See id.
62. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984).
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White Primary Cases indicate. 63
But relative to other associations, political parties have more
characteristics similar to public entities; they have been described as
"public utilities" or as "parties-in-states' clothing.",,, Apart from
campaign finance law there is relatively little federal regulation of
national parties.
State laws heavily regulate political parties,
however; and, when they intervene to control ballot access or party
organization, their interests go beyond liberal norms of fairness and
equal protection. They extend to independent democratic norms:
maximizing political participation, preserving the integrity of the
election process, preventing fraud and corruption, protecting voters
from confusion and undue influence, preventing ballot overcrowding
and the appearance of "frivolous candidates," fostering an informed
electorate, and preserving the stability of the two-party system.
With the institution of the "Australian ballot," states took the
apparatus of voting out of the hands of parties. 65 By printing
standardized ballots listing the name and party label of all legally
nominated candidates, states control ballot access. Most states permit
but curtail through regulation write-in voting. 66 They also limit the
choices available to voters and the opportunities available to
candidates and parties by controlling access to the electoral arena by
minority parties and independents through devices such as filing fees
and petition requirements (including detailed constraints on
permissible signatures).6
The required showing of "significant
support" may operate as an effective bar to ballot access in primary
elections, and states impose even higher thresholds for participation
6
by minor parties and independent candidates in general elections. 8
Because states give nominees of the major parties automatic
63. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 461; Smith, 321 U.S. at 649; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
64. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 155; Mark E. Rush, Voters' Rights and the Legal Status of
American Political Parties, 9 J.L. & POL. 487, 488 (1993). The public utilities analogy is
instructive for its emphasis on "duopoly," but the market analogy is incomplete, and it is
instructive to compare voluntary associations cast as "public accommodations."
65. Epstein qualifies the salience of the link between government provided ballots and
regulation, pointing out that other nations have official ballots but do not regulate the way in
which parties bestow their labels on candidates. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 156. The principal
explanation is "progressive" suspicion of the parties. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST,
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM (rev. ed. 1983).

66. See David Perey, Note, The Dimensions of the Right to Vote: The Write-In Vote,
Donald Duck, and Voting Booth Speech Written-Off, 58 Mo. L. REV. 945, 956 (1993).
67. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 238-39.
68. See Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties
Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 175-76 (1991).
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placement on the ballot, party selection of candidates amounts to a
governmental function. 69 Government-organized primary elections,

the most significant government regulation, supplant or supplement
party caucuses and conventions as the legally mandated process for

nominating major party candidates for federal and statewide offices
in most states. State laws determine whether primary elections are
open, closed, or "blanket." Appealing to the public interest in
preventing "voter raiding," states can exclude voters registered with
one party from participating in the primary of another. 70 (The time
frame obviously determines the stringency of the requirement of
party registration; in practice, the difference between open and closed
primaries may be nil.) 71 State laws may also require candidate loyalty
to the party in which he or she is running in the primary by means of
disaffiliation requirements to avert "divisive sore-loser candidates";

they keep a primary loser from launching an independent candidacy. 2
Overall, "[ain election ballot is a State-devised form through which
candidates and voters are required to express themselves at the

climactic moment of choice. '73
States also regulate the internal organization of major parties,
their procedures, and composition. They designate official governing
bodies like state central committees, or require that state party
executive committees include congressmen. Thirty-six states regulate

the procedures to select state committee members; thirty-two states
stipulate the composition of state committees; twenty-two states
specify when these committees must meet; twenty-seven states
69. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 13-23, at 790.
70. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 n.13 (1986). The Supreme
Court has struck down longer registration periods before voting, but upheld a New York law
requiring registration 30 days before the upcoming general election to vote in the subsequent
primary, that is, about eight months before the general election. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 753, 757 (1973).
71. In practice, self-designation prevails. Even in closed-primary states only a declaration
of past or intended affiliation is required; how people actually vote is secret. In any case, there
is a difference between requirements that allow voters to affiliate or disaffiliate if they wish, and
statutes that set registration requirements that demand so much advance planning and
knowledge that voters cannot reasonably conform to them. Thirty-eight states require closed
primaries. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 235. Louisiana operates a "nonpartisan"
primary. See id. at 228 n.1.
72. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 223-24 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)). For
other examples of intervention, New York law permits any aspirant for a party's nomination
who receives 25% of the party committee's delegates in the convention to appear on the
primary ballot without the party's endorsement; Connecticut law provides for the enforcement
of a primary contest against the candidate endorsed by the party convention. See Rush, supra
note 64, at 498.
73. Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1992).
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regulate internal rules and procedures.74

The catalogue of state interests invoked to justify regulating
ballot access and party organization is broad and vague. It is fair to
say that rationales like ensuring that some order rather than chaos
accompanies the democratic process75 offer little guidance in judging
whether specific regulations are constitutionally permissible in light of
the competing First Amendment right of association. Consider state
control of primary elections. A justification for state-mandated open
primaries is that less inclusive processes alienate individuals and
Another
discourage them from participating in the primary.
justification is that more citizens are drawn into the political process
at this crucial stage in the process by allowing citizens to select
candidates from any party. 76 "The state's interest in... not restricting
voting in the presidential preference primary to those who publicly
declare and record their party preference is to preserve the overall
integrity of the electoral process .... ,77 (In practice, the results both
in terms of the number of competitive primary elections and voter
turnout are not encouraging.)78 But "preservation of the integrity of
the electoral process '79 also justifies state-mandated closed primaries.
In this case, it is said to guarantee that primary election results reflect
the will of party members "undistorted by the votes of those
unconcerned with, if not actually hostile to, the principles,
philosophies, and goals of the party." 80 Put strongly, "a candidacy
of non-party members is arguably a
determined by the votes
81
fraudulent candidacy."
The counterpart of the state's regulatory focus on the electoral
functions of parties is the other face of Janus-faced parties-as
voluntary associations. Parties have an interest in freedom of
association and claim a right to self-government and control over
their internal organization, purposes, and procedures. Party rules
74. "Only five states.., do not specify some aspect of the parties' organizational structure,
procedures and composition." BIBBY, supra note 31, at 96.
75. See V.O. KEY, JR., AMERICAN STATE POLmCs 17 (1956).
76. Alternatively, political competition not participation is the determinative value. Key
proposed this explanation for the direct primary as it evolved in the south as an escape from
one-partyism, a means of popular government where interparty competition was absent. See
BIBBY, supra note 31, at 128. In states with two-party competition, the primary was adopted
more slowly. See id.
77. Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States, 287 N.W.2d 519, 536 (Wis. 1980).
7& See BIBBY, supranote 31, at 147-49.
79. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 846 (D. Conn. 1976).
80. Id.

81. Id. at 847.
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effect contests to "win the party's nominations, elect its candidates,
distribute its patronage, formulate its programs, and allocate
whatever other goods its members seek. '8 2 Parties have a particular
interest in rules for electing state and national committee members
and seating delegates to national conventions. Courts have supported
party autonomy by upholding formulae that deviate from one-person,
one-vote.83
Parties' claims to autonomy are obviously heightened by the fact
that as political associations they should be principal beneficiaries of
the First Amendment protections of speech and association. As
courts and commentators have repeatedly stated, the express political
rights of speech and assembly are of slight value absent a concomitant
4
right of political association.1
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court refined
the constitutional right of association, explicitly recognizing the right
of intimate and expressive associations to choose their own
members.85
As Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurrence:
"Protection of the association's right to define its membership derives
from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is
the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition
of that voice." 6 Clearly, crossover voters in state-mandated open
primary elections could change the party's message. But the integrity
of an association's voice is a concern whether or not there is a clear
and identifiable nexus between membership and the group's political
expression. Even if the association's specific message does not
change because of laws compelling the Jaycees to admit women or
forcing a party to allow independents to vote in its primary, the laws
are potentially transforming. The point of political association is not
just the message but the messenger: who exactly is speaking. At a
minimum, a party whose membership is regulated could be accurately
perceived as affected by state policy-a contradiction of the
democratic purpose of political association. Hence, the sound core of
the thought that "[f]reedom of association means not only that an
individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of
her choice.., but also that a political party has a right to 'identify the
82. RANNEY, supra note 16, at 10.
83. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981).
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430

(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 460 (1958).
85. 468 U.S. 609, 618, 623 (1984); see ROSENBLUM, supra note 14, at 161-72.
86. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633.
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87
people who constitute the association.'"
Despite assertions that freedom to further common political
beliefs necessarily presuppose "the freedom to identify the people
who constitute the association," and claims that primary voting to
89
select the party's candidates is a "basic function" of the party,
regulations determining which voters may participate in primary
elections hold. (These regulations, however, vary from state to state
and judges balance the competing interests differently.)1° Every
permutation of the regulations has been challenged in the courts:
states and parties jointly favoring the exclusion of unaffiliated voters
from participation; 91 states favoring open primaries against party
objections, and vice versa; 92 and a state and national party on opposite
93
sides of a case challenging mandated open primaries.
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed parties'
associational right to open its membership. 94 The Connecticut
Republican Party wanted to broaden its base by permitting
independent voters to participate in its primary so it challenged a law
requiring primary voters to be registered party members. 95 The
96
Supreme Court struck down the law on First Amendment grounds.
The law "limit[ed] the Party's associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
community." 97 Whether party members should include independents
or only those who publicly demonstrate prior commitment to the
party is a question best left to the parties themselves.
Tashjian upheld the Connecticut Republican Party's right to
open its primary. 98 Challenges to closed primaries brought by
unaffiliated voters have been rejected, however. 99 Nonparty members

87. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986)).
88. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (citing
TRIBE, supra note 58, at 791).
89. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986).
90. See Democratic Party,450 U.S. at 122-23.
91. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 753 (1973).
92 See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210-11.
93. See DemocraticParty, 450 U.S. at 109.
94. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211.
95. See id. at 210.
96. See id. at 229.
97. Id. at 216.
9& Id.
99. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973).
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denied the right to participate in a closed primary do have an interest
in the outcomes, the Court observed in another context, but "they are
not 'interested' in primary elections in the crucial, distinguishing
aspect that party members are interested."'10 To date, parties that
may want to avoid open primaries or avoid holding primaries
altogether have not tested the constitutionality of state-mandated
primary elections.
The closest we have come is a Supreme Court ruling that while
states may mandate open primaries, they cannot dictate that primary
results determine who may sit as state delegates to national
conventions.101 In Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin,

the Court asserted the national party's freedom to restrict delegate
selection to voters who "are willing to subscribe to the general
principles of the Democratic Party" by publicly recording their party
preference °2 National party rules trump state laws and state party
rules for the purposes of selecting delegates to the national
convention. 0 3 Because the decision was based on the associational
rights of the party (not just the national party's immunity from state
regulation), DemocraticParty opened the door to future challenges. 104
All voluntary associations challenge regulations that infringe on
their freedom of association. But testing the constitutionality of laws
regulating parties involves a complicating factor that points to
another respect in which parties differ from other voluntary
associations, including other political groups. In practice, regulation
of parties entails laws passed by state legislative majorities and raises
the problem of political entrenchment and self-interest. As Justice
Stevens' argument for deference to Congress' judgment on matters of
campaign reform points out, this position "fails to acknowledge ...
the potential for legislators to set the rules of the electoral game so as
to keep themselves in power and to keep potential challengers out of
it." 105 Regulations are not always the work of the ascendant party

aimed at the other parties or the work of the major parties
100. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 848 (D. Conn.), affd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
101. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981).
102. Id. at 112 n.5 (1981) (quoting Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States, 287
N.W.2d 519, 524 (Wis. 1980)). For statistics on the divergent voting patterns of crossover voters
and identified Democrats, see id. at 118 n.19.
103. Though in practice the moral authority of state delegates chosen in open primaries has
forced the national party to accommodate the state, the Democratic Party seated the Wisconsin
delegation in 1980. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 1775.
104. See Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 124-26.
105. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,644 n.9 (1996).
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collaborating to preserve their dominance against challenges brought
by minor parties or independent candidates. To complicate matters,
the regulations are sometimes best understood as the work of party
leaders in government aimed at the party organization outside. As
such, challenges brought by the party organization represent
intraparty disputes.
Consider Eu v. San FranciscoCounty Democratic Committee. In

Eu, elements of the state Democratic Party challenged regulations
making it a criminal offense for parties to fail to (1) create county
level committees, (2) adhere to a maximum term of office for the
chair of the state central committee, and (3) rotate the chair between
residents of northern and southern California. 1°6 The party also
challenged a state law prohibiting it from endorsing a primary
candidate. 10t The Eu Court overturned these regulations, arguing that
party members have a right to organize a party in the way that will
make it the most effective political organization. 108 As Daniel
Lowenstein points out, this was an intraparty dispute and in deciding
it the Court effectively determined who speaks for the party. °9 The
plaintiffs were "[v]arious county central committees of the
Democratic and Republican Parties, the state central committee of
the Libertarian Party, members of various state and county central
committees, and other [partisan] groups," and the Court referred to
these officials as "governing bodies" of the parties.110 By accepting
them as speaking for the major parties, the Court ignored the fact
that neither major party state central committee was a plaintiff."' It

also in effect denied that party leaders in the legislature rather than
party officials spoke for party members.,, 2
This overview indicates that political parties have a unique legal
status among voluntary associations. But by itself, neither states'
distinctive interests in regulating parties nor parties' distinctive
interests in freedom of association indicate why they should be
considered primus interpares.

106. 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 229-30.
109. Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 1779.
110. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219,222.
111. See Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 1781-83. Lowenstein's thesis is that legislators (party
leaders in Congress) have a better claim to speak for the party than party officials. See id.
112. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 14, at 73-157, for discussions of the "integrity" of an
association as well as who speaks for members of churches and a host of nonreligious groups.
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Political parties compete with voluntary associations of all kinds
for members and resources of time, money, and loyalty. They
compete directly with other political groups as providers of the
organization that draws citizens into political activity. But there is a
division of labor between political parties and advocacy groups,
interest groups, and the rest of the gamut of organized political
voices. Only parties are principally concerned with candidates and
elections. The goal of parties is not to "maximize the number of
people who express an attitudinal preference for it" but to contest
elections effectively.113 This dictates the qualities of association that
make parties unique and uniquely valuable contributors to
democracy.
To serve their purposes effectively, parties must have long-run
organizational and political goals-unlike PACs and the campaign
organizations of individual candidates. In contrast to most interest
and advocacy groups, parties must continuously seek to establish
contact with the electorate in a fashion that elicits participation on a
large scale. Parties do more than help recruit and support candidates
for an extensive array of offices at every level of government. Indeed,
the objective of contesting elections successfully involves more than
campaign activities, registration drives, voter guides, and turnout. It
requires long-term development-establishing local presence,
developing cadres of activists, coordinating the support of social
leaders, and a drive for membership from every salient group. 114
Parties raise and define public issues, engage in political education,
choose officers, enact rules for process and representation, and decide
on their purposes and policies as well as strategies. They are
distinctive sources of information and experience in forming political
judgments. They are forums for reasonably deliberative collective
decision-making about public life. Potentially, they are the most
important agenda-setting institution for the public interests of society
as a whole. In all these respects, parties' value is independent of
particular electoral successes, but it is dependent on their vitality as
membership groups.
Closely connected to this functional division of labor between
parties and other political groups are three defining characteristics
113. Frendreis et al., supra note 10, at 227.
114. See id.
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that give political parties in the United States their unique normative
status. They make party membership qualitatively different from
membership in other associations.
First, major American parties bridge local and national
citizenship. Whereas nonparty political associations are typically
local or national, parties cover the terrain. In a country with
fragmented government and a shifting array of political associations,
115
major parties are reasonably omnipresent federated structures.
Most candidates for public office at every level of government carry
major party labels, and the official ballot institutionalizes these labels.
It follows that parties alone deal with a comprehensive range of local
and national issues and bring local organizations in touch with
national political affairs, and vice versa. Active membership signals
commitment to both local and national community. With this, parties
bring some coalescence if not unity to our understanding of political
life.
This is particularly so because the major American parties have
continuity. Most political groups-for example, interest groups and
community-based service groups-are comparatively short-lived.
Democrats and Republicans have confronted one another since the
1860s. The major American parties have a place in history, and what
is vulgarly referred to as "reputational brand capital."11 6 They have
traditions. As a result, they cannot avoid public accountability for
their continuity; they must be perceived as transcending the shortterm proliferation of issues and personalities.
Accordingly,
membership entails identification with an institution that has deep
connections to community and public events.
The second defining characteristic of parties is that they are
integrative.
American parties draw support from every
socioeconomic group. No other political association pulls together
such large and diverse segments of the population as measured by
socioeconomic status, religion, or sectionalism (the most enduring
division between the major parties is race). Precisely to the extent
that the major parties are broad and encompassing, they embody the
democratic norm of inclusiveness. This means that American parties
avoid divisive cleavages based on "particularist" definitions of ethnic
or cultural status or the boundaries of citizenship. It means that
115. Regional one-party domination is a recurrent feature of American party politics. See
V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN PoLmTcs IN STATE AND NATION 298-316 (1984).
116. Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479,

1523 (1994).
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parties have every incentive to reach out to other groups;
"representativeness" is their explicit purpose.
At any historical point, of course, parties have "core
constituencies." But alliances like the one that generally prevails
between labor unions and the Democratic Party are the exception.
One reason is that organized interests typically have their own
political arms-PACs, lobbyists, and so on; they are not dependent
on parties to serve as their intermediaries to government. In fact,
concerned as they are with specific policy outcomes, many organized
interest groups support candidates who they hope will advance their
policies from both major parties. That is why one characterization of
parties' key role is to give expression to "shadow interest groups"those who because of resources do not have independent political
organizations."1 7 The decline of important forms of associations and
memberships generally, documented by civil society theorists, has
significance for political parties: it makes them more important.
Parties are not coalitions of well-organized interests with
predetermined preferences, then. But neither are they simply the
voice of heterogeneous unorganized voters; their inclusiveness is not
a matter of giving expression to diffuse majority sentiment. Rather,
parties are dynamically integrative. "The major parties must do what
the pressure groups need not do at all; they must consider the balance
of relations among the interests." 1 8 They are mini-associative
democracies, usefully described as the "intermediate intermediaries."
These two defining characteristics of parties lead directly to the
third: their comprehensiveness. Parties are preoccupied with wideranging agenda setting at regional levels and for the nation as a
whole. Unlike interest and advocacy groups whose agendas are often
restricted to a single (sometimes uncompromisable) principle or
policy, party agendas are broad and open-ended. Unlike candidatecentered campaign organizations attuned to immediate "issues" that
promise short-term political benefits, 19 parties can identify and attend
to long-term problems. Some minor parties are more like interest
117. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as
Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1990). This is not to endorse
Macey's account of parties as "political brokerage firms," as "arbitrageurs who signal politicians
of citizens' preferences and thereby inform politicians about how to obtain political support," a
matching process that "lowers the transaction costs to certain citizens of entering the political
process." Id. at 1-2.
118. SCHAT-rSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 98.
119. "[I]ssues are merely what politicians use to divide the citizenry and advance
themselves." DIONNE, supra note 8, at 332.
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groups-devoted to a particular cause such as prohibition or right to
life. But the major parties have comprehensive and necessarily
flexible aims. Interest groups cannot do what parties can do in a
diverse society: bring together the claims of groups and formulate
issues in a comprehensive and effective manner.
This helps explain why parties rarely "mirror" the stated
interests and values of their members (or voters). Partisans do not
have preexisting exogenous preferences with regard to most issuesthe range is too broad and preferences are not "independent of the
products offered." 120 In this respect, the description of voters as
"consumers" is complex; the vulgar implications are inapt. Parties are
less responsive to partisans' opinions than forums for political
judgment. Again: "Parties are as much engaged in prioritizing
choices, and therefore suppressing some of them, as they are in
expressing alternatives that may exist in the minds of ordinary
citizens. '121 Parties are the political institution committed to
articulating and advocating one among competing notions of the
public good. As Schattschneider states:
The mobilization of majorities in recognition of the great public
interests, the integration of special interests with public policy, and
the over-all management and planning involved in discriminating
among special interests cannot be done by organized special
of an
interests on their own initiative. These are the functions
1
entirely different kind of organization, the political party. 2
Alone among associations, then, parties offer a comprehensive
map of the political world--cues and symbols that extend across
issues and candidates over time. And active membership in parties
exposes men and women to a distinctive form of political
socialization.
These three defining characteristics of parties point to an
overarching reason why they can be described as primus inter pares.
Together, the inclusive, integrative, and comprehensive nature of
membership makes parties potential deliberative institutions. More
specifically, these characteristics mark parties as institutions that lend
themselves to deliberation about the common good. This is not to say
that parties always demonstrate a principled commitment to
deliberation, only that some kind and degree of deliberation is
Bernard Manin's description of
structurally required today.
120. MANIN, supra note 2, at 225.
121. Polsby, supra note 32, at 41.
122. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 31.
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representative assemblies holds for major parties: "It is the collective
and diverse character of the representative organ, and not any prior
or independently established belief in the virtues of debate, that
explains the role conferred on discussion." 123 Parties are the voluntary
association for deliberating comprehensive, long-term political
agendas. They are the embodiment of the democratic theorists'
"public sphere," where public judgements are formed not through
offers or threats but through persuasion and justification.
If
interparty decision-making is typically characterized as bargaining,
intraparty decisions entail deliberation with reference to evolving
notions of the common good. The party's notion of the common
good is justified by its insight into and effective contribution toward
the public good of the state and nation.
Many associations of civil society have been touted by one or
another democratic theorist as "free public spaces" in which citizens
cultivate public skills, cooperation, self-respect and assertion, and
civic orientation. 124 In the case of parties, we can add experience in
forming judgments about political directions and candidates-the
dispositions specifically required of citizens by representative
government. In this context, the dynamic integrative aspect of parties
as associations bears repeating.
For advocates of democratic
deliberation, the essence of "public spaces" is that they encompass
not only preexisting interests and opinions but also half-formed or
unformed views. They do this in a fashion that gives rise to new
politically relevant concerns and projects. Parties fit this description.
National conventions are not simply deliberative bodies, but in other
venues parties at every level can be.
In addition, parties alone among the voluntary associations of
civil society are "strong publics." 121 Their deliberations culminate in
decisions, and if they are electorally successful these decisions may
become legislative programs. (If they are not successful, parties'
articulations of public interests may nonetheless alter the public
agenda.) The important point is that ideally, and to a reasonable
extent in practice, parties are deliberative associations. Their failure
to effectively deliberate can be a prime source of electoral and
governance weakness.
123. MANIN, supra note 2, at 187.
124. See, e.g., SARA M. EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN AMERICA (1992).
125. See Jean L. Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND
CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 55, 58.
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These defining characteristics comprise normative reasons for
designating parties primus inter pares. They account for the parties'
intrinsic value, contributing to democratic education and political
culture. They provide justification for preserving and strengthening
parties, and, because they are inseparable from parties as
membership groups, they justify strengthening parties as
participatory, voluntary associations.
This justification has obvious affinities to the concerns of civil
society theorists, but it diverges from the two dominant arguments for
strengthening parties. Familiar arguments for strengthening parties
as agents of "responsible party government" give principal place to
political fragmentation, governance, and the accountability of
political representatives to party officials.126 In democratic theories of
political equality, on the other hand, the focus is on legal reform of
the electoral system as a whole to insure equality of rights among
voters, candidates, and parties.127
I discuss these positions
elsewhere. 128 For now, suffice to say that neither advocates of
responsible party government nor advocates of political equality
focus on the internal associational life of parties or on their vitality as
membership groups. For the most part, in both the legal and political
science writings on parties, the normative characteristics that make
them primus inter pares among voluntary associations-their
inclusiveness, integrative role, comprehensiveness, and capacity for
deliberation--drop from view.
THE NoMos OF PARTIES AS VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

Consider just a few significant purposes of parties that are left
out of the leading accounts of party renewal, which are principally
concerned with governance and unequal political influence:
* The distinctive political education of active members in an
association whose concern with the public interest is longterm and comprehensive.
* Parties as potentially deliberative institutions.
Their
inclusiveness and integrative dynamic gives them a
comparative advantage relative to other political groups to
126. See COMMITrEE ON POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 11, at 1-2, for an important
formulation.
127. See, e.g., BEITZ, supra note 12.
12& See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups (Nov. 12, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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conference, accommodate, and generate new positions.
Parties' irreplaceable part in identifying, recruiting, and
guiding political leaders, which is dependent on a party
structured to continuously attract active members from
every quarter and bridge the concerns of activists and
voters.
* Ultimately, parties' claim to moral support. In contrast to
advocacy and single-issue groups, parties draw in
unorganized as well as organized members who may not be
committed to a set of policy preferences. Parties' failure to
attract these citizens leaves them without a political voice.
The forces strengthening and weakening parties' ability to fulfill
these purposes are not all external, and the legal framework and
general political culture are not the whole story. What one scholar
observes about campaign finance is true more broadly: it is quite
conceivable that "the parties' role in campaigns ultimately may
depend more upon their own initiative than present financing laws. ' 129
The party's own nomos-its rules, leadership, and self-defined
purposes-are as important as public laws, probably more so.
The party's nomos is reflected in part in the association's rules
and procedures. It is true that "[o]f all the many factors that affect
the fate of candidates, factions, policies, and programs, party rules are
the most easily manipulated."' 30 But what matters are the purposes
for which rules are made and altered-whether changes are more
than the tactics of factions jockeying for short-term advantage.
"Politicians live their lives in the short-run.' 131 Parties live in the
long-run.
The political science literature on party rules always converges
on the National Democratic Party reforms of the 1968-72 McGovernFraser Commission, enacted in large part to enhance openness and
*

participation.132 Among the most salient changes were increasing the

importance of primaries in selecting presidential candidates by ruling
that delegates would be seated at the national convention only if they
were chosen through open primaries; 133 requiring proportional
129. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 363.
130. RANNEY, supra note 16, at 209.
131. Gary Orren, The Changing Styles of American Political Parties, in THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE 4, 35 (Joel L. Fleischman
ed., 1982).
132. See RANNEY, supra note 16, at 27.
133. See BIBBY, supra note 31, at 179-80.
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representation of women and blacks; 134 calling on party elements to
expand the role of members vis-a-vis party leaders by permitting
participants in caucuses and national conventions to speak and vote
135
their consciences rather than follow the lead of party bosses;
abolishing proxy voting and the unit rule (which required each state's
delegation to cast its entire vote for the majority presidential
preference); 136 and ending favorite son delegates and prohibiting ex
officio delegates.137 This change was reversed in 1988 when automatic
slots for unelected, uncommitted "super-delegates"-members of the
Democratic National Convention, state party chairs, Democratic
governors, and a certain proportion of the party's congressional
delegation-were restored.
The reforms were contested within the Democratic Party and
have been fiercely criticized by political pundits and academic
commentators since. 138 Austin Ranney characterized the rules debate
as a contest between the goals of representativeness and success at
the polls.139 The goal of representativeness accents the expressive
function of party organization. That is, the issue for apportioning
national committee members and setting delegate credentials is how
well party institutions give expression to members' interests and
values. 140
Representativeness takes a back seat to "combat
effectiveness" when party rules are based on the goal of nominating
"electable" candidates.1 41
The counterpart of expressive/competitive organizations in
accounts of the McGovern-Fraser Committee reforms is the
distinction between purists and pragmatists, or "party regulars." That
is, "passionate amateurs" who cannot abide by normal politics and
are loyal to the party only insofar as it advances ideals versus regulars
who see integral value to the party and are willing to compromise
principles to accommodate party factions and appeal to voters as
134. See RANNEY, supra note 16, at 27-28.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. I will not take up the question that dominates the literature: whether these reforms
were responsible for the party's electoral decline. I am inclined to agree with those who argue
that they were the culmination of longer-term trends, and not a principal cause, of the decline of
Democratic dominance from the 1930s.
139. RANNEY, supra note 16, at ill.
140. More specifically, Ranney and others pose the question of intraparty representation as
a conflict between the representation of political preferences versus the representation of
demographic and identity groupings. See, e.g., id at 112-15.
141. See id. at 135.
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necessary to win elections. 142
The expressive/instrumental typology of party organization is
valuable insofar as it draws attention to the membership face of
parties and to internal associational life. But it also has limitations,
even as a description of this particular set of Democratic Party rules
changes. Intraparty contests over process are always tied to electoral
goals as well as party self-government.
Reformers are rarely
concerned with democratization or doctrinaire stances in contrast to
electoral success. There is also evidence that differences between socalled purists and regulars do not carry over into key actions in
support of candidates.1 43 The distinction between ideological activists
and regulars is misleading too because it implies that the latter are
sheer instrumentalists for whom winning is unconnected to
programmatic goals. Consider that the progressive tradition of the
Democratic Party in terms of government activism and liberal social
reform is firmly entrenched-at least as a relative matter. Party
regulars considered themselves better trustees of this history and the
association's future than reformers. And one reason why Democratic
reforms from 1968 to 1972 passed successfully was precisely their
congruence with Democratic commitments to openness and the
reformers' recognition that internal party organization was properly a
matter of national public concern. 144 The reformers had better insight
into the party's nomos.
Correcting the underrepresentation of women and minorities
was crucial to party legitimacy. But representativeness by itself does
not insure that parties will exploit their unique characteristics as
comprehensive, integrative, and substantively deliberative bodies.
Notable in all of this is that the national Democratic response to party
decline at the time was to debate rules. This focus on process marks
much of the political science and legal literature on party renewal as
well. Rule changes were not accompanied by comprehensive
assessments of the party as a membership group. They did not lead to
substantive deliberation, changes of program (for example,
moderation
of the Democratic Party's commitment
to
"governmentalism" at the expense of civil society and the values that
142. Beitz notes that national party rules are made by party officials who may not be
representative of the membership. BErrz, supra note 12, at 190.
143. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 131.
144. See David Plotke, Party Reform as Failed Democratic Renewal in the United States,
1968-1972, 10 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 223, 260 (1996), for an explanation of the reasons for the

success of the reforms given the opposition.

2000]

PRIMUS INTER PARES: POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

525

entails), or enhanced recruitment of members in an attempt to close
gaps between activists and voters.
In fact, Democratic Party reform was based on a partial view of
the imbalance in party membership. The reforms added women and
blacks, but delegates continue to be of high status and income. 145 For
some time, voting and party membership have exhibited a decrease in
the number of participants from the lower class. 14
This is
exacerbated by the fact that, as Beck and Sorauf point out, the
decline of parties in candidate or issue-dominated elections gives less
access to lower income voters and an advantage to the uppersocioeconomic elite of both the left and right. 47 Recent declines in
voter turnout have come disproportionately from lower status and
less educated voters, "disenfranchised so to speak by a growth of
politics less and less linked to parties." 148
It is commonly thought that major changes, including this
demographic shift in party membership, are the result of external
forces not under the parties' control. The switch from electoral
dependence on manpower to dependence on money and media is said
to diminish the significance of precinct level face-to-face
involvement. 149 It has doubtless had consequences for parties'
commitment to recruiting activists. So has the fact that candidates
can communicate directly with voters via the media, though this
would seem to be more salient for candidate-centered campaign
organizations than for standing parties overall. Too much can be
made of these forces, however. Some state and local parties continue
to be exemplary volunteer organizations, not just small cadres of
party officers. Research indicates that grassroots precinct work by.
party members is electorally significant in local elections. 50 It is not
so clear that money per se "squeezes out" participation, then. Parties
do. Strengthening parties as membership groups has the possibility of
reversing this trend, but only if they make increasing membership
from among targeted groups and areas a principal long-term
145.

See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 129.

146. See id. at 223.
147. Id. at 470.
148. Id. at 470-71.
149. The declining importance of manpower to campaigns is also traced to the decline of
patronage and preferments available to parties as a result of civil service reforms and court
decisions. For a skeptical view based on comparative politics, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 113,
269-71.
150. An example is the Republican Party of Nassau County, Long Island. See BECK &
SORAUF, supranote 9, at 81.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:493

objective.
Ultimately, party strength depends on recruiting active members.
All voluntary associations gain membership through vigorous
recruitment. Few groups, with the possible exception of focused,
single-issue groups, get self-motivated joiners. I observed earlier that,
at present, civic-minded citizens are more inclined to join social
service type volunteer organizations that have "a real impact" on the
community than parties.5l They are also more likely to work for
candidate campaigns, 15 2 though this is a more direct avenue to party
participation than other associations. In any case, even with robust
state parties, membership is not spontaneous or self-maintaining.
The significant barriers to voting have not turned out to be legal
and bureaucratic (registration methods, for example) but attitudinal.
Reducing the "cost" of activism is not the same as mobilizing voters,
and the same can be said of participation in party activities. 153
Recruiting party members is on a continuum with cultivating voters,
but it is not identical. Candidates must appeal to voters. Candidates
typically build ad hoc, activist enclaves devoted to their particular
interests. Parties, however, must appeal to and enlist partisans in a
wider range of activities over time. (This is hardest for minority
parties in noncompetitive localities and states. In such circumstances,
offices are frequently won by default.) The impact of state and local
parties is less on overall vote totals than on recruitment. Recruiting
requires party organizations that cover the electoral territoryblanketing precincts or counties. It requires convincing leaders of
other voluntary associations-professional associations, unions,
community groups, and so on-to ally with parties and encourage
their membership to participate in party activities. In short, it
requires institution-building aimed at establishing regular
participation and deliberation as the permanent backbone for the
periodic cycles of caucuses, campaigns, and conventions.
Beck and Sorauf observe:
In very few party systems has the separation between the party
organization and the party's faithful voters been as great as it is in
151. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, NEW MILLENIUM PROJECr
PART I: AMERICAN YOUTH ATTITUDES ON POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP, GOVERNMENT AND
VOTING (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://www.nass.org/nass99/youth.html>.
152. See id.
153. See LYNNE M. CASPER & LORETIrA E. BASS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VOTING
AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1996, at 9-10 (1998), for a discussion of
data on party registration and voting since the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 went
into effect.
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the American party system. American parties largely have failed to
integrate the party's most loyal supporters into the party
organization.... Nor have the American parties mounted any
substantial program to educate their loyal electorates into the
principles and traditions of the party. They view even the most
sympathetic voters
as a separate clientele to be reinforced anew at
15 4
each election.
This failure lies with party officials comfortable with the status
quo, interested in "winnability" above all and supportive of the least
controversial candidates. It lies. with party leaders who are arrogant
towards members and citizens overall and treat their positions as
personal fiefdoms. It also lies with those who are suspicious of
mobilization and resistant to opening up the association to
substantive claims and deliberation.
Building parties as membership groups is tied to a number of
factors. For one thing, it depends on party patronage. It is not
dependent on preferments and material rewards, but rather the
capacity of parties at every level to identify and implement measures
that advance the fortunes of groups and neighborhoods. That is,
recruitment depends on demonstrating the "real impact" of politics,
countering the belief that parties do not "count."
Building parties as membership groups also depends in part on
the commitment of visible political leaders at every level to use the
bully-pulpit to advocate political participation via parties-for
instance, as they have done through community service. Political
officials typically cultivate their own constituencies and personal
loyalty, not party activism. Leadership is imperative if parties are to
return idealism to partisanship.
Recruitment depends in part on countering the evidence of
Robert Lane's "unhappy polity."' 15 Polling places are grim; lawn
signs and bumper stickers are few; contacting has declined. The
positive face of partisanship deserves attention. Reintroducing the
hoopla of elections is a matter of manpower not media. Making
election day a national holiday would help, too.
Finally, and most important, recruitment depends in large part
on agendas. That is, it depends on not allowing process and
"electability" to crowd out ideas, statements of value, deliberation,
and programs.
If one wants to improve deliberation, a riveting program is apt to
154. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 9, at 141.
155. Lane, supra note 13, at 362-64.
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spur better discussion. If one wants to expand participation, a
plausible route to achieving desired results can be very
engaging .... If the idea is to replace the decayed leadership of one
or both parties, a powerful alternative proposal is a good start.'6

Parties must actively form political alternatives and excite civic
consciousness among voters-all of whom are potential members.
Parties are (or can be) the initiators of the terms of political debate.
Their job is to see that the terms they set correspond to cleavages and
values-to social reality. When they do, "the electorate appears as
157
the origin of the terms to which it responds in elections.'
Agenda setting is as important a party function as campaigns.
Technical expertise by party leaders and hired professionals is
essential for activities like fund raising or media presentations. But it
does not apply to programmatic goals. These cannot be relegated to
advocacy groups, think tanks, or the entrepreneurial efforts of
individual candidates. The way parties spin off of unofficial
subsidiary groups-coteries of sympathetic officials in government
and contributors like the Democratic Leadership Conference (with its
own think tank, "convention," and chapters in several states)-is a
sign of internal party vitality. However, it has limitations insofar as it
does not add substantively to party agendas.
Agenda setting is not the same as identifying parties with specific
policy promises, as responsible party government advocates would
like. Agendas are not necessarily platforms (though they may be).
Agenda setting is also distinct from "selling" divisive issues to passive
(well-polled) constituents; in this limited sense, every electoral
endeavor seizes on issues of some kind. There must be some hook to
distinguish "ins" from "outs." "Representatives are persons who take
the initiative in proposing a line of division. ' 158 But intraparty
negotiating and purely strategic calculations of the market for votes is
not the whole of agenda setting. For that, parties must operate not
just as filters for narrowing down the array of preexisting preferences
but as forums for the exercise of political judgment and deliberation.
The normative question, then, is the extent to which party
agendas are the substantive outcome of deliberation among a broad
and active membership. Party renewal depends on exploiting the
associations' unique characteristics of inclusiveness, comprehensiveness, and dynamic integration. But these characteristics, in turn,
156. Plotke, supra note 144, at 284.
157. MANIN, supra note 2, at 223.

158. Id. at 226.
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come only from participation, not just from qua activists in periodic
campaign mode but as members of this unique voluntary association.
This is not a brief for maximizing party membership per se; there
is little value in having intraparty decisions that replicate in miniature
the liabilities of brute majoritarianism and direct democracy. It is
simply to say that the democratic value of parties is both the cause
and effect of their distinctive nomos as vital membership groups.

